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Abstract—Energy storage technologies are key to improving
grid flexibility in the presence of increasing amounts of inter-
mittent renewable generation. We propose an insurance contract
that suitably compensates energy storage systems for providing
flexibility. Such a contract provides a wider range of market
opportunities for these systems while also incentivizing higher
renewable penetration in the grid. We consider a day-ahead
market in which generators, including renewables and storage
owners, bid to be scheduled for the next operating day. Due to
production uncertainty, renewable generators may be unable to
meet their day-ahead production schedule, and thus be subject
to a penalty. As a hedge against these penalties, we propose an
insurance contract between a renewable producer and a storage
owner, in which the storage reserves some energy to be used
in case of renewable shortfalls. We show that such a contract
incentivizes the renewable player to bid higher, thus increasing
renewable participation in the electricity mix. It also provides
an extra source of revenue for storage owners that may not be
profitable with a purely arbitrage-based strategy in the day-ahead
market. We validate our analysis through two case studies.
Index Terms—Energy storage, renewable energy, electricity
market, decision-making, contract design
I. INTRODUCTION
The fast ramp capability of storage technologies makes them
ideal candidates to improve system reliability as renewable
penetration in the power grid deepens [1]. In recent years,
the most cost-effective entry point for storage operators in
the electricity market has been in the ancillary market [2].
However, this market is relatively small as compared to those
that cover other grid services and may start to saturate as more
energy storage systems enter the market. For instance, there is
operational evidence that the PJM RegD market has become
saturated [3]. Therefore, new market opportunities are needed
to incentivize storage capacity to increase in the grid.
One potential option is the peaking capacity market. In
California alone, a total of 13GW of peaking capacity provided
by conventional generators is expected to retire within the
next two decades, while the frequency regulation market in
the entire United States is estimated at 5GW [4]. However,
at current storage prices, arbitrage to provide energy in the
energy markets based on mechanisms such as time of usage
prices are rarely cost-effective [5]. We argue that market
mechanisms in which storage operators are compensated for
their provision of flexibility rather than merely arbitrage to
provide energy on demand are needed. Such a mechanism will
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have two benefits. One, by providing extra revenue to storage
owners, it will boost investments into storage technology even
further. Two, as storage becomes more economical, it will lead
to a higher penetration of intermittent renewable energies into
the grid, while ensuring reliability of electricity supply.
In this paper, we propose the design of a mechanism on
the lines of an insurance contract between a storage owner
and a renewable producer. Through this contract, the storage
commits to reserve some energy to be used in case of
renewable shortage, while the renewable purchases the right
to call upon this reserve if needed. The contract is only
feasible when there exists a reserve price for which both
participants voluntarily agree to sign it. We show that the
insurance contract incentivizes the renewable producer to bid
higher in the day-ahead market. We also derive a condition
for which a storage unit is profitable as an insurance provider,
even if it is not profitable in the day-ahead market. Combined,
these results prove that the insurance contract proposed is an
opportunity to boost storage participation in the market, while
increasing the share of renewable energy in the electricity mix.
This insurance contract can be viewed as lying between
the two extremes of the ISO incurring the increasing cost
of system reserves in a grid-takes-all-renewable scenario and
the renewable incurring the entire cost of its intermittency. In
practice, there is already a move towards asking renewable
producers to shoulder (some) of the responsibility of hedging
against their own variability. For example, the Bonneville
Power Administration (BPA) has a self-supply program in
which variable energy resources are allowed to supply their
own balancing services in lieu of incurring the cost of the
services provided by BPA [6]. The mechanism we propose is
a step towards putting such ad hoc arrangements on a firmer
analytical footing. The novelty of our approach consists of: (i)
requiring the renewable producer to incur his own uncertainty
cost, leading to a scenario where this cost is borne by the
agent who causes the electricity supply to become less reliable.
This is in contrast to most market operations, which socialize
reserve costs among, for example, load serving entities; (ii)
modeling the renewable generator and the storage as indepen-
dent players that aim to find a contract that can benefit them
both. Previous works have largely considered these energy
sources to be operated jointly or that they are standalone
players that do not interact; and (iii) providing analytical and
numerical results which bring insights about how the proposed
contract serves as an extra economic incentive both for storage
technologies to enter the market and for renewables to increase
their participation in the electricity mix.
We focus on a stylized two-settlement market composed
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2of a day-ahead market and an ex-post imbalance resolution
mechanism. In the day-ahead market, suppliers offer their
production for delivery in the next operating day, and their
production schedule is settled by an Independent System Oper-
ator (ISO). Generators that deviate their actual production from
their schedule are penalized. These policies have traditionally
been imposed for non-renewable, firm generators; however,
the adoption of the same treatment for intermittent renewable
generators has also started recently, as grids move away from
a take-all-renewables approach [7]. However, levying of such
penalties may lead to renewables bidding conservatively in the
market [8]. The proposed insurance contract can counteract
this undesirable decrease in renewable participation, while
properly compensating sources of flexibility.
A related stream of work analyzes how independent storage
operators can take advantage of arbitrage opportunities in the
market [9], [10], [11]. There are numerous studies regarding
the simultaneous participation of storage in multiple services,
such as energy, reserve, and ancillary services [12], [13], [14].
Although exploring multiple market services allows for a full
overview about the revenue potential for storage, it comes at
the expense of tractability. This may lead to complex models
being solved numerically and a lack of insights about the
results achieved. Thus, we consider only the day-ahead energy
market. A similar approach has been used, e.g., in [15], in
which the adoption of cap contracts by storage systems as a
hedge against price volatility is analyzed.
Several works have analyzed the optimal placement and
sizing of energy storage in the grid [16], [17], [18]. While we
do not focus on the placement problem, we evaluate how this
aspect plays a role in the adoption of our insurance contract
in a case study in which the location of the storage in the
grid is varied. The cooperation between storage and renewable
sources has also been explored at length in the literature, as
in [19], [20], [21]. These schemes are often approached as a
joint operation or a centralized problem, and our formulation
departs from this paradigm by considering the energy sources
to be independent agents maximizing their own profit. Lastly,
risk factors due to renewable variability are included in a
variety of previous works. For instance, [22] designs a hybrid
system with considerations to the probability of having insuf-
ficient supply, [23] analyses the pairing of a risk-averse wind
producer and demand response in the day-ahead market, and
[24] considers uncertainty when modeling spinning reserve
requirements for a microgrid. In our formulation, uncertainty
stemming from renewable production influences the price of
the insurance contract, as the storage bears more risk when
the likelihood of a renewable shortage is high.
Paper Organization: The mathematical models are intro-
duced in Section II. Section III presents the utility functions of
the participants, and the insurance contract design problem. In
Section IV, we derive the strategies of the participants in the
day-ahead market, and their conditions to sign the proposed
contract, which are used to analyze the contract’s feasibility
and the profitability of the storage. Section V presents two case
studies, followed by conclusions and directions for future work
in Section VI. The main proofs are given in the Appendix.
II. SUPPLY AND ELECTRICITY MARKET MODELS
Energy Storage Model: Consider a time horizon divided into
N discrete time slots indexed by k ∈ K := {0, 1, ..., N − 1}.
The state of charge of the storage xk is the amount of energy
stored at the beginning of time k. We consider a perfectly
efficient storage whose state of charge follows the dynamics
xk+1 = xk − uk ∀k ∈ K, (1)
where uk is the energy extracted from or injected into the
storage, which is positive (resp. negative) if the storage is
discharging (resp. charging). The input uk can be denoted as
the difference between the discharged u+k ≥ 0 and the charged
u−k ≥ 0 quantities at time k. Then, (1) can be rewritten as
xk+1 = xk − u+k + u−k ∀k ∈ K. (2)
The storage state and inputs are constrained by
0 ≤ xk ≤ E ∀k ∈ K (3)
u+k u
−
k = 0 ∀k ∈ K (4)
u+k , u
−
k ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ K. (5)
The constraint (3) sets the bounds on the amount of energy that
can be stored in the storage unit, (4) is a complementarity con-
straint which prevents simultaneous charging and discharging,
and (5) is a positivity constraint. Using the storage dynamics
(2), we can write (3) recursively to find the compact form
0 ≤ x0 +A+u+ +A−u− ≤ E, (6)
where A+, A− ∈ RN×N are triangular matrices with
A+ij = −1 and A−ij = 1 for all i ≥ j. The column vectors
u+, u− ∈ RN are defined as u+ = [u+0 , ..., u+N−1]T and
u− = [u−0 , ..., u
−
N−1]
T . Further, 0 is the null column vector
of size N , and E = E1T, where 1T ∈ RN is the all-ones
column vector. The initial condition x0 = x01T accounts for
the initial state of charge of the storage, and can be removed if
the device is initially discharged. Note that the inequalities in
(6) are element-wise. Let U denote the set of all pairs (u+,u−)
that satisfy the storage constraints (2) – (5). A storage policy
(u+,u−) is said to be feasible if (u+,u−) ∈ U .
We initially ignore the power constraint of the storage,
which restricts its ramp rates. Although we consider a perfectly
efficient storage, the problem can be generalized to a more
complex model. As shown in [25], if the complementarity
constraint (4) holds, the storage dynamics become
xk+1 = αxk − 1
η+
u+k + η
−u−k ∀k ∈ K, (7)
where α ∈ (0, 1], η+ ∈ (0, 1] and η− ∈ (0, 1] are the leakage
coefficient, discharging and charging efficiency, respectively.
In Section IV-B, we derive conditions for which constraint (4)
is satisfied. Further, the power constraint, the efficiency and
the leakage parameters are incorporated in the storage model
in the case study in Section V-B. Without loss of generality,
we let the storage be initially discharged, so that x0 = 0 in (6).
Renewable Production Model: The renewable production
is modeled as a discrete-time random process defined by
R = {R0, ..., RN−1}. For each time k, the random variable Rk
3has a continuous and twice differentiable probability density
function fk(rk) and cumulative density function Fk(rk). For
simplicity, the random variables {Rk} are assumed to be
mutually independent.
There are many works that consider estimating the prob-
abilistic model for renewable production empirically from
historical data. Intuitively, the uncertainty added by this data-
driven approach may decrease the renewable producer’s ex-
pected profit, as discussed in [8]. Improving sensors and
forecast methods to make the estimate more accurate can help
mitigate this effect.
Electricity Market Model: We model a two-settlement mar-
ket which consists of a day-ahead (DA) market followed by
an imbalance settlement that penalizes uninstructed deviations.
The market is operated by an independent system operator
(ISO) who is responsible for meeting the load reliably. In the
DA market, all generators bid the amount of energy they are
willing to commit for delivery in the next operating day. Each
player also informs the ISO of their asking price, which is the
minimum per-unit price they are willing to accept to deliver
the amount committed. The ISO clears the market using a
least-cost strategy.
The ex-post imbalance resolution mechanism penalizes the
generators that do not supply the amount of energy that they
were cleared for. We focus on the bidding strategies of a
renewable producer and an energy storage. Since renewable
production is stochastic, this producer may be unable to meet
his commitment in real-time. We assume that all renewable
production exceeding the commitment is curtailed. If the
renewable production is below its commitment, it pays a
penalty per unit of shortfall λp that is fixed and known. We
note that the imbalance penalty considered can be thought of
as a payment related to uninstructed deviations from dispatch
instructions that is settled in real-time (e.g. as described in the
CAISO market settlements [26]). Further, the penalty values
can be modeled as random variables that are assumed to be
statistically independent of the renewable production of the
player considered in the insurance contract by replacing the
price λp by its expected value.
We ignore transmission line congestion and the emergence
of locational marginal prices, and thus all generators are paid
a single market price. Incorporating such constraints would
require a more complex mathematical model, which is left as
a direction for future work. Nonetheless, we perform a case
study in a constrained network in Section V-B to illustrate
numerically that the insurance contract proposed can be ex-
tended to a more general framework. Following other works
which analyze a small subset of agents in the market, such as
[8], [27], [15], the market participants are assumed to be price-
takers. It follows that the DA energy price λ , [λ0, ..., λN−1]T
can be treated as fixed and known. Finally, we assume the load
to be known. All these considerations simplify the analysis and
allow us to focus on the insurance contract being proposed.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
a) Utility Functions: The utility function of each partic-
ipant is his expected profit.
Baseline case: Both the renewable and the storage only
bid in the day-ahead market and insurance contracts are not
allowed. The expected profit of the renewable producer is
Jbr (Cr) =
N−1∑
k=0
λkCrk − ERk [I(Crk −Rk)λp(Crk −Rk)] ,
where Cr = [Cr0, ..., Cr(N−1)]T ∈ RN contains the com-
mitments for each time k, and I(.) is the indicator function,
which equals 1 if the argument is positive and 0 otherwise.
For each k, the first term corresponds to the revenue acquired
for committing to the day-ahead market. The second term is
the expected penalty due to shortage, which is taken over the
random renewable production. The utility for the storage is
Jbs (u
+,u−) =
N−1∑
k=0
λk(u
+
k − u−k )− g(u+k , u−k ), (8)
where, for each k, the first term is the revenue for supplying to
and the cost for demanding from the market. The second term
is the operational cost of the storage. We assume the function
g(u+k , u
−
k ) to be convex and strictly increasing in (u
+
k , u
−
k ).
Insurance contract case: If the storage and the renewable
players are allowed to establish an insurance contract for
reserve, the expected profit of the renewable producer becomes
Jcr (Cr,Gr, pir) =
N−1∑
k=0
λkCrk − pirkGrk
− ERk [I(Crk −Rk −Grk)λp(Crk −Rk −Grk)] ,
(9)
where the vectors Gr = [Gr0, ..., Gr(N−1)]T ∈ RN and pir =
[pir0, ..., pir(N−1)]T ∈ RN contain the reserve amounts and
(per unit) prices for each time k. Compared to the baseline
case, the renewable producer has the additional cost of the
contract, and the reserve amount helps decrease the expected
penalty. For the storage unit, the expected profit is
Jcs (u
+,u−, pis) =
N−1∑
k=0
pisku
+
k − λku−k
− ERk
[
g(min(Crk −Rk, u+k ), u−k )
]
,
(10)
where the vector pis = [pis0, ..., pis(N−1)]T ∈ RN is the per
unit price of reserve. The last term is the expected operational
cost, which shows that the amount supplied by the storage
is the lesser of the renewable shortage and the reserve in
the contract. We initially consider that the storage supplies
energy exclusively to the renewable and charges from the grid.
However, we show in Section IV-B that the storage decides
on a contract through which it is only committed to supply
to the renewable player at certain times of the day. Thus, for
the remaining hours, the storage can trade in the electricity
market in whichever opportunities are available, as long as it
has the amount of energy decided in the contract at the time
established. In this sense, the contract proposed serves as an
additional stream of revenue for storage units in the market.
b) Contract Design Problem: Through an insurance con-
tract, the storage unit commits to maintaining some energy
reserve available to be used in case of renewable shortage.
The contract is signed ex-ante, while in real-time, the storage
4is called upon to supply this reserve in case of renewable
shortage. If the shortage is less than the reserve established
in the contract, the storage unit will supply only the amount
needed to cover the shortfall; if the reserve is not enough to
cover the shortage completely, the storage supplies the entire
reserve and the renewable producer is responsible for paying
a penalty for the shortage remaining.
An insurance contract C is defined as the pair {pi,G} that
establishes the price per unit pi = [pi0, ..., piN−1]T ∈ RN and
amount of energy G = [G0, ..., GN−1]T ∈ RN to be set aside
as a reserve by the storage at each time k. We say that C is
• individual rational if no participant is worse off by
signing the contract, i.e. if the expected profit for any
participant does not decrease when she participates in
the contract;
• feasible if it induces a storage policy (u+,u−) ∈ U and
is individual rational.
The renewable producer tries to maximize his own utility
when deciding how much to bid in the day-ahead market and
how much reserve to procure through an insurance contract.
These decisions are made sequentially, as the contract is signed
ex-ante. In the day-ahead market, the renewable player solves
problem P1 below, where Gr and pir are treated as given. For
the insurance contract, the problem to be solved is P2.
P1 : max
Cr≥0
Jcr (Cr,Gr, pir), P2 : max
Gr,pir≥0
Jcr (C
∗
r ,Gr, pir)
For the storage, P3 refers to the day-ahead market decision
on how much to charge, given the amount decided to supply
to the renewable. For the insurance contract ex-ante decision,
P4 is solved. Both problems are subject to (u+,u−) ∈ U .
P3 : max
u−≥0
Jcs (u
+,u−, pis), P4 : max
u+,pis≥0
Jcs (u
+,u−∗, pis)
These problems can be easily defined for the baseline case
by maintaining only the day-ahead problem, letting the reserve
amounts and price be zero, and letting the storage supply to the
grid instead of to the renewable producer. This formulation can
also be adapted into a chance-constrained problem by adding
constraints that limit the probability of renewable shortage,
such as Prob(Rk < C∗rk) < α. Although that is an interesting
problem, here we ignore the chance constrained formulation
for simplicity.
IV. MAIN RESULTS
A. Renewable Participation
The renewable generator solves the profit-maximizing prob-
lems P1 and P2 to decide how to participate in the market.
Theorem 1. The optimal renewable day-ahead bid is given by
C∗rk = G
∗
rk + F
−1
k
(
λk
λp
)
, (12)
where the optimal reserve to be purchased in the insurance
contract is the maximum available if the per unit price satisfies
pirk ≤ λk, (13)
and G∗rk = 0 otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix VI-A.
The optimal renewable strategy reduces to that for the
baseline case if we let the reserve be zero. As a buyer, the
renewable producer sets an upper bound on the reserve price.
If the storage asks for a price above this threshold, no contracts
are feasible. Note that the renewable producer’s bid increases
with the amount of reserve purchased through the contract.
B. Storage Participation
Even in the deterministic baseline case, deciding how much
energy to offer is a complex task for the storage, specially due
to the non-linearity in the complementarity constraint (4). The
following result shows that this constraint can be relaxed.
Lemma 1. Given a strictly increasing operational cost func-
tion for the storage and considering this participant is a profit-
maximizer, the complementarity constraint u+k u
−
k = 0 for all
k ∈ K always holds, both in the baseline case and in the
presence of an insurance contract.
Proof. See Appendix VI-B.
Lemma 1 allows us to remove the non-linear constraint (4).
With this, the storage baseline problem becomes a convex
optimization problem. Let k = max (resp. k = min) refer
to the time with the maximum (resp. minimum) day-ahead
price. Further, let ek denote the standard k−th basis vector
whose k−th entry is equal to 1 and all other entries are zero.
Theorem 2. The optimal storage policy in the baseline case is
u− = eminE, u+ = emaxE,
that is, an arbitrage strategy is adopted. Further, it is indi-
vidual rational for this player to sign an insurance contract
following this policy if the reserve price for k = max satisfies
pis,max ≥ λmax − g(E, 0)
E
(
1− Fr,max(Cr,max − E)
)
+
1
E
∫ Cr,max
Cr,max−E
g(Cr,max −Rmax, 0)fmax(r)dr.
(14)
Proof. See Appendix VI-C.
The lower bound the storage sets on the reserve price can
be interpreted as the minimum price for which the per unit
expected profit earned through the contract is at least equal to
the per unit expected profit that can be achieved by offering
that energy in the day-ahead market. This bound depends on
how likely it is that the renewable shortage is less or greater
than the insurance reserve, as that determines the expected
storage cost. Such dependence is expressed through the terms
that include the renewable production probability functions,
and the lower bound (14) increases as the expected renewable
shortage increases. When a shortage at least equal to the
insurance reserve surely happens, that is as
Prob(Rmax ≤ Cr,max − E)→ 1,
then pis,max → λmax and the storage will require at least the
price that he would get in the day-ahead market.
We remark that this result can be readily extended to a
storage that is not perfectly efficient at the expense of more
5notation. In this case, the arbitrage policy adopted would cover
a wider interval of time periods, depending on the power rating
and the efficiency of the storage. This device would still charge
around the times when the energy price is low, and discharge
around the times of high prices. Thus, an insurance contract
could be signed at any of the time periods in which the storage
would discharge to the grid.
C. Insurance Contract Feasibility
In what follows, we analyze if the renewable and the storage
players ever agree on the economic terms of the contract.
Theorem 3. Let the storage adopt the arbitrage policy
u− = eminE, u+ = emaxE.
Then, the interval of per unit reserve prices for an insurance
contract to be feasible under this policy is given by
I = [pis,max, λmax],
with pis,max as in (14), and is always non-empty.
Proof. See Appendix VI-D.
Insurance contracts are thus always feasible for our frame-
work, which considers an unconstrained network. For a con-
strained network, in Section V-B, we show that feasibility will
depend on the location of the players in the grid, due to the
differences in locational marginal prices across the network.
The worst-case scenario for the storage unit occurs when the
renewable shortage is at least as large as the reserve amount
established in the contract. In this case, the storage unit will
incur the operational cost of supplying the full reserve. For a
given insurance contract, we can use this fact to establish a
lower bound on the expected profit of the storage.
Corollary 1. Let the storage unit follow the arbitrage policy in
Theorem 2 to offer the reserve u+ = emaxE in the insurance
contract. Then, the contract with a reserve price pimax = λmax
is feasible, and leads to a storage expected profit that is lower
bounded by the day-ahead expected profit for the same policy.
Proof. See Appendix VI-E
D. Storage Profitability Analysis
We analyze whether the storage owner can be profitable as
an insurance provider, even though it is not competitive in
the day-ahead market. We highlight that we do not make any
inferences about how profitable this energy storage may be in
any services other than the day-ahead energy market. Instead,
we compare the participation in the day-ahead market versus
the provision of reserve to a renewable generator through an
insurance contract. The following result follows from direct
inspection of the expected profits for the storage unit in the
baseline and in the insurance contract cases, and establishes a
condition for the storage profitability in the day-ahead market.
Theorem 4. Let pi denote the per unit price of reserve in the
insurance contract and define the bounds
Λ = 1− g(0, E)
λmaxE
− g(E, 0)
λmaxE
(15)
Λ =
pi
λmax
− g(0, E)
λmaxE
− g(E, 0)Fr,max(Cr,max − E)
λmaxE
(16)
− 1
λmaxE
∫ Cr,max
Cr,max−E
g(Cr,max −Rmax, 0)fmax(r)dr
When adopting an arbitrage policy, the storage is profitable
as an insurance provider, but not in the day-ahead market, if
Λ ≤ λmin
λmax
< Λ. (17)
Proof. Proof follows from direct inspection of the expected
profits for the storage unit in the baseline and in the insurance
contract cases. We simultaneously check conditions for which
this player is not competitive in the day-ahead market (Jbs ≤
0), but is profitable as an insurance provider (Jcs > 0).
Condition (17) establishes bounds on the ratio between the
minimum and the maximum day-ahead prices. This price ratio
is determinant to how much profit the storage can earn using
arbitrage. If the lower bound holds, the difference between the
maximum and minimum day-ahead prices is not high enough
to cover the storage operational costs and yield a positive profit
for this unit in the day-ahead market. On the other hand, the
upper bound is satisfied when the payments from the insurance
contract are high enough to cover both the storage operational
cost and the payments made to charge from the grid.
This analysis shows that storage technologies that are still
too expensive to bid in the day-ahead market may, instead,
offer their energy to renewables through insurance contracts.
These contracts serve as alternative sources of revenue for such
storage units, keeping them from being idle when they lack
competitiveness, and providing additional economic incentives
for the improvement of their technology. We remark that in
California, for example, it has been identified that there is
a limit to the amount of storage that can provide peaking
capacity according to their 4-hour rule, which credits storage
units that can sustain 4 hours at maximum output [4]. Further,
the price ratio (17) increases as more peak-shaving services are
provided, making it more likely that the lower bound holds,
and thus more difficult for new storage operators to enter
the market. Thus, we can envision that insurance contracts
will allow for a higher penetration of storage in the grid by
serving as an entry point in the market for peaking capacity.
In Section V-A, we perform a case study in which we show
that the condition in Theorem 4 is not too stringent.
E. Model Extension - Two-Way Contract Structure
We extend our model to a full insurance contract which
permits production exchange from the renewable to the storage
if there is excess renewable generation. Trading this excess
production is beneficial for both players. For the storage,
purchasing energy at a price lower than the market price leads
to a decreased cost of charging. For the renewable, selling
6excess energy at any price is preferable to being curtailed.
The possibility of an extra revenue may affect the renewable
participation in the market, as any increase in the day-ahead
commitment is now also linked to a decrease in the expected
revenue from selling excess generation. To evaluate this trade-
off, we modify the renewable utility (9) to add the opportunity
to sell excess production at the price piek for each k.
Jr(Cr,Gr, pir, pie) =
N−1∑
k=0
λkCrk − pirkGrk
+ ERk [I(Rk − Crk)piek(Rk − Crk)]
− ERk [I(Crk −Rk −Grk)λp(Crk −Rk −Grk)] .
(18)
The following results hold for every time instant k ∈ K, but
the time subscript is suppressed for notational simplicity.
Proposition 1. Let the renewable generator sign an insurance
contract with the two-way structure described in Section IV-E.
Then, for small enough pie, the optimal commitment C∗r
satisfies the equilibrium condition
λ = λpFR (C
∗
r −Gr) + pie (1− FR(C∗r )) . (19)
On the other hand, for large enough pie the player chooses to
offer its maximum capacity in the day-ahead market if
pieµR ≤ λCr−pirGr−ER [I(Cr −R−Gr)λp(Cr −R−Gr)] ,
where µR is the expected renewable production. Otherwise,
the renewable generator bids zero in the day-ahead market
and sells all production to the storage unit.
Proof. See Appendix VI-F.
The above analysis assumes that the storage voluntarily
agrees to purchase the excess renewable energy. Thus, pie can
be at most the energy price λ. If the time considered is such
that the renewable player has no insurance contract, but is
still able to sell excess energy to the storage unit, we can set
Gr = 0 and rewrite (19) to find the optimal renewable day-
ahead commitment as C∗r = F
−1
R
(
λ−pie
λp−pie
)
. Thus, we note
the opportunity cost between selling energy to the market or
to the storage. The higher the reselling price pie, the lower the
day-ahead commitment. This leads to an increased likelihood
of having excess energy to resell. Conversely, C∗r increases
with the day-ahead energy price λ.
V. CASE STUDIES
For both cases studied, we estimated the renewable produc-
tion distribution from the Wind Integration National Dataset
[28], [29]. For each month, a Gaussian distribution was fitted
for the hourly wind production in each hour of the day,
assuming the productions to be independent across time.
A. Single-Node Case
We consider four hubs within the Midcontinent Independent
System Operator footprint – Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, and
Indiana. We use the day-ahead prices of these hubs that refer to
2018 [30]. Four different wind productions are modeled based
on each location. The storage unit investigated is a lithium-
ion battery with energy capacity E = 12MWh and a linear
variable operation and maintenance cost of $7/MWh [31].
We initially seek to confirm the existence of feasible insur-
ance contracts in all four locations. We considered the contract
in Corollary 1 and generated 1000 scenarios for renewable
production to evaluate the profit achieved by the storage
both when a contract is signed, and in the baseline case.
Fig. 1 shows the results, where the shaded area corresponds
to the profit variation observed across the 1000 scenarios
generated in the presence of an insurance contract. As proved
in Corollary 1, the storage’s expected profit with an insurance
contract is lower bounded by the profit achieved in the baseline
case. These profits are closer in cases with higher probabilities
of renewable shortage, since this leads to the storage having
to supply energy more frequently.
We also evaluated the condition in Theorem 4 to check if
there are days when the storage investigated is profitable as
an insurance provider, but not in the day-ahead market. The
results in Fig. 2 show that this situation happens more often
in the Minnesota hub, while it is less frequent in Indiana. This
happens because Minnesota is where the storage has the lowest
day-ahead expected profit, leading to the highest number of
days in which this unit can be profitable as an insurance
provider, but not as a supplier in the day-ahead market.
Finally, we evaluated how much renewable energy was
taken by the grid in real-time. Through an insurance contract,
the storage commits to deliver some energy at the time with
peak demand, if needed. Thus, we focused our analysis on that
hour, as the behavior of the renewable generator during other
times reduces to that observed in the baseline case. Fig. 4
shows that the insurance contract leads to an increase in the
renewable energy share in the grid at the time of peak demand,
for all hubs and all months. This is due to the change in the
optimal bidding strategy of the renewable generator, which
gives more room for extra production to be taken by the grid.
B. Modified IEEE 14-Bus Test System Case
We evaluate the insurance contract on the constrained IEEE
14-bus test system shown in Fig. 5. We adopt the data from
MATPOWER [32] with the following modifications: (a) all
transmission lines have a 80MW capacity; (b) generators at
buses 1 and 2 have a 15MW ramp rate for 30min reserves;
(c) a wind power plant with 32MW capacity is added; (d) a
battery with energy capacity E = 50MWh, power capacity
P = 20MW, linear cost $7/MWh, loss factor α = 0.95,
charge and discharge efficiencies η− = η+ = 0.85 is added.
We analyze a multi-period set-up with N = 24 time slots
corresponding to each hour of the day. The distribution for
the wind production was estimated considering the month of
July and the location in the Illinois hub. Further, we added a
demand profile that follows a typical daily demand curve for
July in this hub, which was inferred from the day-ahead price
curve for this location and month. We considered the penalty
for a shortage is such that the ratio λk/λp = 0.4 ∀k.
We solve for an optimal economic dispatch for this system.
We consider 14×14 scenarios, with all possible combinations
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Fig. 1. Storage average daily profit for baseline
(red) and insurance contract (blue) cases. Shaded
area shows profit variation across 1000 scenarios.
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Fig. 2. Number of days per month in which the
storage unit is profitable as an insurance provider,
but not in the day-ahead market.
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Fig. 4. Increase in renewable energy share at peaking demand time.
Fig. 5. IEEE 14-bus test system used in this case study.
of bus location for the renewable and the storage players. For
each case, we let the wind producer be scheduled based on
its baseline commitment and we observe the optimal schedule
profile for the storage unit. Then, we determine if an insurance
contract is feasible in each case, considering the storage can
supply the amount of energy that it was scheduled for in the
baseline case, since we know that this is a feasible trade. In
this constrained network, the participants will consider their
own LMPs when deciding on the price bounds that will make
it profitable for them to have an insurance contract. Fig. 3
shows the results, where each square is green if the insurance
contract is feasible when the wind producer is located at bus
x and the storage is at bus y, and red otherwise.
We observe that all squares in the diagonal, corresponding to
when the renewable and the storage players are co-located, are
cases with feasible insurance contracts. This result conforms
with our analytical studies and the previous case study. There
are cases, however, in which it is not individual rational for
both players to have a contract. This is explained by the price
disparity between certain nodes in this network. The storage is
discharging at times with high demand, during which the grid
becomes congested. The distribution of generation and load in
this test case is such that node 1 has consistently the lowest
LMP during congestion times, and node 2 has the highest one.
If the renewable generator is at node 1, he will set an upper
bound on the contract price that is significantly lower than any
other LMP; thus, if the storage is at any other node, he will
not accept such a low offer, since supplying to the market at
any other LMP is more profitable. This scenario represents the
vertical line of red squares in Fig. 3. Similarly, if the storage is
at node 2, he will set a lower bound on the contract price that
is too high for the renewable generator to accept if he is at any
other node. The significant price gap between the LMP at bus 3
and at all the other buses explains the remaining cases with no
feasible insurance contracts. The LMPs at all the remaining
buses are close together, allowing for an insurance contract
to be signed in the remaining cases. It could be argued that
the storage owner should simply disregard the possibility of
an insurance contract and install the storage system at the
bus that is more likely to have a high LMP. However, as
the number of storage units in the grid increases, the LMP
peaks will decrease due to the peak shaving aspect of the
storage operation in the grid. Thus, buses at which insurance
contracts are currently infeasible may experience a change in
this condition once the distribution of storage, as well as of
other generators and loads, in the grid changes.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We proposed an insurance contract between a renewable
producer and a storage. We showed that this contract is feasible
and individually rational, promotes the increase of renewable
participation in the market, and serves as an extra source of
revenue for storage units that are not profitable in the day-
ahead market yet.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Using backwards induction, we solve for C∗rk taking the
contract decisions as fixed. The utility function (9) is concave
8in the commitment decisions. Using the first order conditions,
λk − λpFRk (Crk −Grk) = 0⇒ C∗rk = G∗rk + F−1Rk
(
λk
λp
)
.
Substituting C∗rk back in the expected profit, we have
Jcr =
N−1∑
k=0
(λk − pirk)Grk + λkF−1Rk
(
λk
λp
)
− ERk
[
I
(
F−1Rk
(
λk
λp
)
−R
)
λp
(
F−1Rk
(
λk
λp
)
−R
)]
.
This can be rewritten as Jcr =
∑N−1
k=0 (λk − pirk)Grk +
Jbr (C
∗
r), where J
b
r (C
∗
r) is the expected renewable profit for the
optimal baseline commitment. Then, it is individual rational
for this player to purchase any available reserve if pirk ≤ λk.
Otherwise, this generator is better off without the contract.
B. Proof of Lemma 1
Let (u+,u−) and (u˜+, u˜−) be storage policies such that
−u+k + u−k = uk, u+k u−k = 0 (20)
−u˜+k + u˜−k = uk, u˜+k u˜−k > 0 (21)
Following [25, Theorem 1], we can show that u+k < u˜
+
k and
u−k < u˜
−
k . Therefore, for a strictly increasing cost function,
g(min(Crk −Rk, u+k ), u−k ) ≤ g(u+k , u−k ) < g(u˜+k , u˜−k ). (22)
Let Js and J˜s be the storage profit under these policies. The
storage is better off with the policy satisfying the complemen-
tarity constraint if and only if Js > J˜s. From (20) and (21),
u˜+k − u+k = u˜−k − u−k := Uk > 0.
In the presence of an insurance contract, and for the case
min(Crk −Rk, u+k ) = u+k , the inequality Js > J˜s gives us
g(u˜+k , u˜
−
k )− g(u+k , u−k ) > pisk(u˜+k − u+k )− λk(u˜−k − u−k )
g(u˜+k , u˜
−
k )− g(u+k , u−k ) > (pisk − λk)Uk. (23)
From (22), we note that the left hand side of (23) is positive.
Thus, this condition always holds if pisk ≤ λk. This inequality
coincides with the upper bound set by the renewable on the
reserve price (13), so it must hold when a contract is signed.
Thus, in the presence of an insurance contract, the policy
satisfying u+k u
−
k = 0 will be chosen and the constraint (4) can
be relaxed. It is straightforward to note that this also holds if
min(Crk − Rk, u+k ) = Crk − Rk, as well as for the baseline
case, for which the right hand side of (23) will be zero.
C. Proof of Theorem 2
Since the storage baseline problem is convex, an optimal
solution will satisfy the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) condi-
tions. Let µ = [µ
0
, ..., µ
(N−1)]
T and µ = [µ0, ..., µ(N−1)]
T be
the Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the lower and upper
storage energy constraints (6), respectively, and the multipliers
ρk and ρk refer to the positivity constraint (5). Further, let
A+Tk and A
−T
k be the transpose of the k-th column of A
+
and A−. For every k, the KKT conditions are given by
λk − ∂
∂u+k
g(u+k , u
−
k )−A+Tk µ+A−Tk µ+ ρk = 0, (24)
−λk − ∂
∂u−k
g(u+k , u
−
k ) +A
+T
k µ−A−Tk µ+ ρk = 0, (25)
µ ◦ (A+u+ +A−u−) = 0, (26)
µ ◦ (E−A+u+ −A−u−) = 0, (27)
where, A ◦B denotes the element-wise product of matrices A
and B. Lastly, all multipliers must be non-negative. Proof that
an arbitrage policy is optimal in the baseline case follows from
direct inspection of (24)–(27) for u+ = emaxE and u− =
eminE. If the storage signs the insurance contract and offers
E at time k = max, his expected profit is
Jcs = (pis,max − λmin)E − g(0, E)
− ER,max[g(min(Cr,max −Rmax, E), 0)].
(28)
The last term in (28) can be rewritten as∫ Cr,max−E
0
g(E, 0)fmax(r)dr +
∫ Cr,max
Cr,max−E g(Cr,max −
Rmax, 0)fmax(r)dr. If he opts out and only bids in the
day-ahead market instead,
Jbs = (λmax − λmin)E − g(0, E)− g(E, 0). (29)
Individual rationality holds if Jcs ≥ Jbs . Using the expressions
above and recognizing that
∫ Cr,max−E
0
g(E, 0)fmax(r)dr =
g(E, 0)Fr,max(Cr,max−E) yields the condition in Theorem 2.
D. Proof of Theorem 3
The upper bound (13) on the price is greater than or equal
to the lower bound (14) for k = max if
g(E, 0)
(
1− Fr,max(Cr,max − E)
) ≥∫ Cr,max
Cr,max−E
g(Cr,max −Rmax, 0)fmax(r)dr.
(30)
The right-hand side integral can be bounded from above by the
quantity g(E, 0)
(
Fr,max(Cr,max)− Fr,max(Cr,max − E)
)
,
and further, g(E, 0)
(
1− Fr,max(Cr,max − E)
)
, which is the
same as the left-hand side of (30). Thus, the condition for the
reserve price interval to be non-empty holds.
E. Proof of Corollary 1
The arbitrage policy is feasible, and, from Theorem 3, the
contract price proposed is the upper bound of the interval that
guarantees individual rationality for both players. Then, this
insurance contract is feasible. To find the lower bound on
the profit, we analyze the worst-case scenario. In this case,
min(Cr,max −Rmax, E) = E, which leads to Jbs = Jcs .
F. Proof of Proposition 1
The first and second order derivatives of Jr are
∂Jr
∂Cr
= λ− λpFR (Cr −Gr)− pie (1− FR(Cr)) (31)
∂2Jr
∂C2r
= −λpfR (Cr −Gr) + piefR(Cr) (32)
9Note that (32) will be negative (resp. positive) for small (resp.
large) enough pie, which means the function is concave (resp.
convex). Further, condition (19) is found by setting (31) to
zero. In the convex case, the optimal bid is found by checking
when the expected utility is maximized at each boundary.
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